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NO. 45864
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-31020

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following Luther Hill’s guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, the district
court sentenced Mr. Hill to three years in prison, with one year fixed. Mr. Hill then moved for a
reduction in his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”). The district court
denied his motion. Mr. Hill appeals, and he contends the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence and by denying his Rule 35 motion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Hill committed the crimes of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of I.C. 37-2732(c), and
1

possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of I.C. 37-2734A. (R., pp.8–9.) These allegations
arose from a traffic stop in which law enforcement found a plastic baggie with a trace amount of
methamphetamine. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 p.3.) According to Mr. Hill, he
had been clean and sober for over two months, but he accidentally left the baggie in his car that
contained this trace amount of residue. (PSI, p.3; Tr. Vol. I,2 p.15, Ls.8–13.) Mr. Hill waived a
preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to district court. (R., pp.15, 17–18.) The
State then filed an Information charging Mr. Hill with both offenses. (R., pp.22–23.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Mr. Hill pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charge. (Tr. Vol. I, p.7,
Ls.19–22, p.15, L.3–p.18, L.10.) The State also agreed to recommend a sentence of four years,
with one year fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.7, Ls.22–24.) In addition, the State did not object to Mr. Hill’s
screening for Veteran’s Court and Drug Court. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, Ls.1–4.)
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Hill was not accepted into Veteran’s Court, Drug Court, or
Mental Health Court. (R., pp.44, 49; Tr. Vol. II, p.26, Ls.17–21.) At the start of the sentencing
hearing, the district court rejected Mr. Hill’s request to continue the sentencing hearing in order
for him to reapply to Drug Court. (Tr. Vol. II, p.26, L.22–p.27, L.16.) The State recommended a
sentence of four years, with one year fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.30, Ls.6–8.) Mr. Hill’s counsel
requested a sentence of one year fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.32, Ls.18–20.) The district court sentenced
him to three years, with one year fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.37, Ls.5–11.) Mr. Hill timely appealed
from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.59–61, 63–64.)
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 316-page electronic document with the confidential exhibits.
There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry of plea
hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the sentencing hearing.
2

2

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hill filed a pro se Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.67–73.) His trial
counsel also filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. (R., p.86.) The district court notified
Mr. Hill of its intent to rule on the motion and gave him fifty-five days to file any supplemental
information. (R., p.93.) Acting pro se, Mr. Hill moved to dismiss his counsel, asserting that he
did not want his counsel to handle any further matters on his case. (Aug. R., pp.1–3.) He also
moved to change venue due to his issues with counsel and his concern these issues would
prejudice the district court judge against him. (Aug. R., pp.5–7.) The district court granted his
motion to discharge his counsel, but denied his motion to change venue. (Aug. R., pp.9–10.)
Mr. Hill then filed two supplemental documents to support his Rule 35 motion. (Aug. R., pp.12–
24) The district court issued an order denying his motion. (Aug. R., pp.25–26.)

ISSUES
I.

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of three
years, with one year fixed, upon Mr. Hill, following his guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance?
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hill’s Rule 35 motion?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Three Years,
With One Year Fixed, Upon Mr. Hill, Following His Guilty Plea To Possession Of A Controlled
Substance
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Hill’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
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maximum. See I.C. § 34-2732(c) (seven year maximum). Accordingly, to show that the sentence
imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Hill “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002). “‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Here, Mr. Hill argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. He contends the district court failed to give
adequate weight to the mitigating factors in his case, including his mental health issues,
substance abuse issues, employment and education history, and veteran status. Proper
consideration of these mitigating circumstances supports a lesser indeterminate sentence for
Mr. Hill or the opportunity to re-apply to a specialty court.
A defendant’s prior military service is a recognized mitigating factor. State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89, 91 (1982). In the case at bar, Mr. Hill is a veteran of the United States Armed Forces.
(PSI, p.11.) He was in the United States Army from 1991 to 1995, and he served as a combat
medic in the Persian Gulf War during Operation Desert Storm. (PSI, p.11.) He was honorably
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discharged. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Hill’s prior military service stands in favor of a more lenient
sentence.
Mr. Hill’s mental health issues also stand in favor of mitigation. Idaho Code § 19-2523
requires the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s mental health condition if it is a
significant factor, and the record must show that the sentencing court adequately considered this
factor when imposing a sentence. I.C. § 19-2523; Delling, 152 Idaho at 132–33. Here, Mr. Hill
was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) in the late 1990s, early 2000s.
(PSI, p.12.) Sometime in 1999, Mr. Hill was committed to a mental hospital for approximately
one month. (PSI, pp.12, 19.) Mr. Hill reported that his diagnosis is attributable to his past trauma
experiences while serving in the U.S. Army. (PSI, p.19.) He received this diagnosis through the
Veteran’s Administration, and he has taken mental health medication in the past. (PSI, p.12.) His
mental health condition is a significant factor for consideration at sentencing.
Along with his mental health condition, Mr. Hill also suffers from a substance abuse
disorder, but is extremely motivated to overcome his drug addiction. A sentencing court must
give “proper consideration of the defendant’s [substance abuse] problem, the part it played in
causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”
Nice, 103 Idaho at 91. The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s criminal conduct is “a
proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho
405, 414 n.5 (1981). In this case, Mr. Hill abused alcohol, cocaine, and heroin for many years,
and then began using methamphetamine intravenously at age forty-five. (PSI, pp.12-13.)
Methamphetamine became his drug of choice. (PSI, p.13.) Mr. Hill has had significant periods of
sobriety, but he recently relapsed, eventually leading to the residue possession in the instant
offense. (PSI, pp.3, 13, 26.) Now at age fifty-six, Mr. Hill is fully committed to regaining his
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sobriety. (PSI, p.13.) In the presentence report, Mr. Hill stated that he would do “whatever it
takes” to stop using drugs. (PSI, p.13.) He was highly amenable to a specialty court or inpatient
treatment. (PSI, p.14.) He explained that he never had the opportunity to participate in this kind
of programming, and he believed that it would be very beneficial for him. (PSI, p.27.) Similarly,
he informed the district court at sentencing, “I’m scared. I need help. I know that. If afforded the
opportunity, I wouldn’t let you down for any of the help you decide.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.33, Ls.1-4.)
Mr. Hill’s substance abuse issues and his high motivation for treatment strongly support a lesser
sentence.
Despite his struggles with his mental health and substance abuse, Mr. Hill has
demonstrated that he can be a productive, contributing member of society. In addition to being
honorably discharged from the army, Mr. Hill graduated from Calvary Christian College and
Seminary in 2013. (PSI, p.10.) He obtained two master’s degrees in Biblical Studies and
Christian Counseling. (PSI, p.10.) Moreover, he obtained a doctorate in Theology. (PSI, p.10.)
Along with an interest in theological studies, Mr. Hill helped other veterans and was “very
patriotic and active in the voting process.” (PSI, p.9.) He also maintained steady employment.
(PSI, p.11.) He was self-employed as a vendor, such as selling food items in downtown Boise,
and has done this work for many years. (PSI, pp.11, 20, 114, 115; Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.20–21.) In
the summer, he worked for a wildland fire suppression company. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Hill’s
extensive educational background, work history, and involvement in his community also support
a more lenient sentence for him.
In summary, Mr. Hill maintains the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence. The district court failed to exercise reason because it did not give adequate
weight to the mitigating circumstances in Mr. Hill’s case. These mitigating circumstances, if
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properly weighed, warrant a reduction in Mr. Hill’s indeterminate time or the opportunity to
reapply to the specialty courts.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hill’s Rule 35 Motion
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and
apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The
Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett,
134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
Here, Mr. Hill offered new and additional information to support a reduction in his
sentence. He set forth multiple reasons to warrant leniency, including prison overcrowding,
inadequate medical care, and overall poor treatment since his incarceration. For example, he
informed the district court that overcrowding in the prison created “astonishing” conditions.
(R., p.68.) He explained that overcrowding caused lockdowns and other movement restrictions.
(R., p.68.) He stated that he had never experienced such disrespect and disregard for inmates in
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need. (Aug. R., p.13.) He also asserted his medical treatment in prison warranted a sentence
reduction. (R., pp.69–70.) He stated the medical staff was “vindictive.” (R., p.69.) He explained
his experience with the medical staff’s negligence, mistreatment, abuse, especially for his optical
care. (R., pp.72–73; Aug. R., p.15.) He contended that no one “deserved” such treatment.
(R., p.73.) In his supplemental letter, he explained that he finally received medical care, but now
he was being denying “off compound approval.” (Aug. R., p.12.) For relief, he initially requested
a sentence of two years indeterminate or probation, but later he requested a mandatory release
date and the option to participate in a specialty court. (R., p.70; Aug. R., p.14.) In light of this
information of prison overcrowding, poor medical care, and overall treatment, the district court
abused its discretion by denying Mr. Hill’s Rule 35 motion. This information supported the
requested reduction in Mr. Hill’s sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hill respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. In the alternative, he
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion
and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 31st day of July, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, electronically as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Delivered via e-mail to: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas
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